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take of law as such. Just how far the courts will carry this departure
is a matter of conjecture, but it certainly is a decided step away from
the long established doctrine of relief for mutual mistake of fact but
not for mutual mistake of law.
E. D. G.
Wills: The Intention of the Testator, as Expressed in the Will, is
Binding.-The recent case of In re Manderscheid's Will' is the latest
addition to the long line of Wisconsin cases holding that the will is conclusive evidence of the intention of the testator. In the instant case
the testator made a will in which he treated as advancements various
sums of money paid by him to his sons either for work and labor performed or as trust funds held by him in trust for his sons until they
should have reached maturity. The testator, as shown by the evidence, had really intended to make an equal distribution of his property
but had been in error as to method to be used.
The court in this case follows the rule laid down in the case of
Estate of Wills,2 that where the will had clearly and definitely prescribed the manner in which such amounts should be treated, the tenure
of the will must be effectuated. The intention of the testator must be
ascertained from the will itself and the court will not be allowed,
simply because the will was not expressive of the testator's intention, to change the testimentary instrument.
The rule in the case seems, at first sight, to be extremely harsh, but
nevertheless, it is one of the well settled principles of our law. The
specific question has often been passed upon by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.
In Hopkins v. Holt3 we find this statement of the rule: "When the
language of a will, used in its ordinary sense, is clear and unambiguous,
no exposition will be made contrary to the express.words."
Eastnwn"'s Estate4 and Estate of Goodrich5 give us this version: "The
intention of the testator as collected from the will itself must prevail,
whenever effect can be given to it."
In re Moran's Will 6 together with many other cases 7 give us a
rule similar to this: That, in construing a will, it is the duty of the
court, when possible, to ascertain the intention of the testator from
the will itself, giving the words there plain and ordinary meaning.
When the intention of the testator is clearly expressed it is conclusive.
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